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This paper adds to the overconfidence literature by specifically considering the 
differential nature of information and its use by different classes of investors. The literature 
suggests that overconfidence is a major determinant of stock trading volume. We postulate that 
private investors are more prone to overconfidence bias as compared to institutional investors. 
This implies that turnover in firms with low institutional ownership will be driven more by 
private information while turnover in firms with high institutional ownership will be driven more 
by public information. This is the essence of the two hypotheses we explore. We find strong 
evidence in support of the first proposition but only mixed evidence in support of the second 
proposition. However, the second proposition is found to be very significant in the most recent 
period if certain low value or low liquidity stocks are excluded from the data.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
           Stock trading volume in financial markets has been extensively studied in the literature 
(for example, Glaser and Weber (2007), Statman et al (2006), Chae (2005), and Covrig and Ng 
(2004)). This attention to trading volume is not without reason. Several studies indicate that the 
trading volume in financial markets far exceeds what would normally be expected from rational 
traders. Glaser et al (2004) calculate the trading volume as a percentage of market capitalization 
in 2002 to be 100% in USA, 215% in UK, 180% in Germany, 115% in France and 70% in Japan. 
They contend that rational motives for trade are not sufficient to explain the high trading volume. 
The high trading volume is even more surprising in view of the finding that those who trade the 
most lose the most (Odean (1999). DeBondt and Thaler (1995) observe that the high trading 
volume in financial markets “is perhaps the single most embarrassing fact to the standard finance 
paradigm.” 
 The traditional neoclassical models of the standard finance paradigm assume investor 
rationality and homogeneity. These models have not been very successful in explaining many 
observed financial market phenomena including the high trading volume of stocks. In an attempt 
to explain these anomalies, there has been a gradual but perceptible shift in the finance literature 
to a behaviorally based paradigm in which investors are imperfectly rational and prone to 
systematic biases. One such judgment bias is overconfidence. Extant cognitive psychology 
literature establishes that overconfidence is a pervasive trait among people. Overconfident 
investors overrate their ability to evaluate securities as a result of overestimating the precision of 
their private information signals. Odean (1999) argues that overconfidence is the key 
determinant of trading volume. Several other researchers support this finding, for example Benos 
(1998), Wang (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001) and Statman et al (2006). 
 Psychologists also find that people systematically underweight some types of information 
and overweight others, and the effects of overconfidence depends on how information is 
distributed in a market and who is overconfident (Odean (1998)). It follows that in order to fully 
gauge the impact of overconfidence on stock trading volume, it is not sufficient to merely 
establish an aggregative relationship but also to fine tune the research format to account for the 
informativeness of the news and the type of investor. As the subsequent literature review shows, 
several researchers have considered these additional dimensions of overconfidence in isolation 
but never together to empirically test the relationship between overconfidence and the volume of 
stock trading. In this paper, we consider in the same model the differential impact of information 
- private and public - on investors - individual and institutional. 
 Trading volume arises from changes in investor beliefs associated with new information. 
The new information may be private or public. Daniel et al (1998) postulate that investors 
overreact to private information and under react to public information. Informed investors 
receive noisy signals about the true value of a security. If the signal is private, they react to the 
signal with overconfidence by overestimating its precision. If the signal is public, then investors 
are not overconfident and correctly estimate its precision. Chuang and Lee (2006) also find that 
if investors are overconfident, they overreact to private information and under react to public 
information. He and Wang (1995) develop a theoretical model in which they show the 
differential impact of public and private information on trading volume pattern. They posit that 
private information mostly influences the trading behavior of institutional investors while public 
information influences the trading behavior of both institutional and individual investors. Thus, 
the differential impact of private and public information on volume is well recognized in the 
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literature and must be modeled for a comprehensive study of the effect of overconfidence on 
trading volume. 
 The differences in the trading behavior of institutional and individual investors are well 
documented though the findings are by no means unanimous. Barber and Odean (2008) posit that 
the buying and selling behavior of institutional and individual investors is different. Shefrin 
(2005) surveys the extant literature on heterogeneity in the judgments of individual investors and 
professional investors, and concludes that the two react in opposite ways to past market 
movements and by more than is justified. By and large individual investors forecast future 
returns by engaging in trend following and predicting continuation. Professional investors, on the 
other hand, believe they face mean reverting random processes and are excessive in predicting 
reversals. Covrig and Ng (2004) find a stronger relation between volume and lagged absolute 
return in stocks with greater institutional ownership. Cho and Jo (2006) assume that individual 
investors are more overconfident relative to institutions i.e. these investors are more susceptible 
to the psychological biases when they are processing information than institutional traders. 
Glaser et al (2004), however, come to the opposite conclusion. They find that judgments of 
professionals (traders who work in the trading room of a large bank and investment bankers) are 
biased, and their degree of overconfidence is higher than the respective scores of a student 
control group. In most tasks, this difference is significant. In our model, we let the data decide 
which of the two groups is more overconfident. 
 Tests for the empirical validation of the overconfidence theory have followed one of two 
tracts. One approach is to test the validity of the assumptions on which the theory is based (for 
example, Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), Hilton (2001) and Graham and Harvey (2002)) and 
the other is to test its predictions (for example, Statman et al. (2003), Odean (1999), Daniel et al 
(1998)). The most important prediction of the theory is that trading volume increases with an 
increasing degree of overconfidence. Odean (1998) calls this the most robust effect of 
overconfidence. Statman et al. (2003) test the trading volume predictions of formal 
overconfidence models in the U.S. stock market. Their hypothesis is that high returns will be 
followed by high trading volume because the investment success of investors will increase their 
degree of confidence. They find that share turnover is positively related to lagged returns for 
many months. They interpret their results as evidence of overconfidence. We follow Statman et 
al. to test the relationship between stock turnover and overconfidence for institutional and 
individual investors while allowing for the differential reaction to private and public information.  
  Stock prices reflect both public and private information but the relative proportion of 
each may differ between stocks for reasons such as the dissimilar cost of producing private 
information. Although it is difficult to disaggregate the two kinds of information and measure 
each directly, the literature suggests two indirect measures for quantifying private and public 
information. The first uses price nonsynchronicity as a measure of private information. It was 
proposed by Roll (1988). The correlation of stock return with the market and industry return is a 
measure of public information while the firm specific return or idiosyncratic risk is a measure of 
private information. Roll (1988) showed that price nonsynchronicity has very little correlation 
with public news and seems to capture private information. Price nonsynchronicity as a measure 
of private information has been used in several studies, for example Chen et al. (2007), Durnev 
et al. (2004), and Morck et al. (2000). The second measure of private information is Probability 
of Informed Trading (PIN). This measure was proposed by Easley et al. (1996). It is based on a 
structural market microstructure model and captures the probability of informed trading in a 
stock. In this study, we use price nonsynchronicity to measure private information. 
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 The market microstructure literature recognizes the diversity of motivation, strategies and 
tactics of traders and accordingly models this heterogeneity by various classifications such as, 
‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ traders, ‘newswatchers’ and ‘momentum’ traders, ‘fundamentalist’ 
and ‘technical’ traders, ‘rational’ and ‘noise’ traders. These classifications are not mutually 
exclusive and often overlap to a great extent. In order to be consistent with the previous research 
on overconfidence, we model the trader heterogeneity in terms of ‘institutional’ and ‘individual’ 
traders. We start with all the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms in the CRSP database and 
use two methods to sort the firms in accordance with their degree of institutional ownership.  The 
first is to sort the firms into deciles; the second is to sort them in quintiles. Table 2 reports the 
deciles results and Table 3 the quintile results. The portfolios are rebalanced each year. We select 
the top and bottom decile to represent stocks with high and low institutional ownership 
respectively. Our model is then run separately on the high and low institutional portfolio. 
 The major contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it directly tests the Daniel et al. 
(1998) proposition that investors overreact to private information and under react to public 
information. Existing studies on investor overconfidence typically use stock returns as a measure 
of aggregate information flow without differentiating between private and public information as, 
for example, Statman et al(2006) and Corvig and Ng (2004). Chuang and Lee (2006) do test for 
the differential impact of private and public information but their model is driven by a very 
restrictive assumption under which public information shocks only trading volume and private 
information shocks only returns. Such an assumption is debatable and makes their conclusions 
fuzzy. This study is the first to use a direct measure of private information to test the implications 
of private information on overconfidence trading. Second, this paper is a far more detailed 
empirical investigation of the relationship between trading volume and overconfidence than has 
hitherto been conducted in the literature. Although the overconfidence literature has recognized 
the differential impact of private and public information on traders, and the differences in the 
behavior of institutional and individual investors, the two traits have not been investigated 
together. Third, this paper provides evidence regarding the extent of overconfidence in 
institutional and individual traders. It is generally assumed in the literature that the 
overconfidence trait is found dominantly, if not exclusively, in the individual investors. 
However, Glaser et al (2004), find that judgments of professionals traders are biased, and their 
degree of overconfidence are higher than the respective scores of a student control group. This 
research provides evidence to resolve this conundrum.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we develop the hypotheses; 
Section 3 explains the methodology and formulates the models; Section 4 describes the data 




 Barber and Odean (2000) find that individual investors trade more than can be rationally 
justified. Since this excessive trading does not lend itself to a rational explanation, behavioral 
models have been adduced to explain this observed market phenomenon. Statman et al. (2006) 
propose investor overconfidence as a major driver of over trading. Daniel et al. (1998) also 
model overconfidence and posit that investors overreact to private information and underreact to 
public information. Since excessive trading is particularly associated with individual investors, 
we hypothesize that stocks with low institutional ownership will be more prone to 
overconfidence trading. This provides the rationale for our first hypothesis: 
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H1: Private information is a stronger driver of stock turnover in firms with low institutional 
ownership as compared to firms with high institutional ownership. 
 
Our contention is that private information comprises both good information and noise. 
However, the noise traders are unable to differentiate between the two and trade “on noise as if it 
were information” (Black (1986)). Thus, even if institutional traders are more informed and may 
have more good private information, we posit that their total tradable private information set is 
smaller because of the large preponderance of noise in the set of the individual investors who are 
given more to behavioral biases and fads. Thus, Dow and Gorton (2006) opine that “A large 
literature argues that individual investor trading is subject to a myriad of psychological biases, 
and that such individuals may use various heuristics, ‘popular models,’ as the basis for their 
investment decisions.” A second reason in support of the hypothesis is that “the information 
traders can never be sure that they are trading on information rather than noise. What if the 
information they have has already been reflected in prices?” (Black (1986)). Black further argues 
that information only provides an edge and the possession of good information is not a guarantee 
for a profitable trade. Taking a large position means taking on more risk. So if arbitrage is costly, 
there is a limit to the position that a trader will take. Thus, informed institutional owners may not 
be able to trade very intensively on their good information.  
 The primary cause for stock trade is a change in the information set of investors. The 
information set consists of both public and private information. If the trades of individual 
investors are driven relatively more by private information, we surmise that the trades of 
institutional investors would be driven more by public information. This provides the rationale 
for our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Public information is a stronger driver of stock turnover in firms with high institutional 
ownership as compared to firms with low institutional ownership. 
 
H2 is not actually hypothesized in the overconfidence literature but appears to be a 
natural corollary of H1 that requires empirical validation. Since noise trading – typically an 
individual investor phenomenon – will be strongest in firms with low institutional ownership, the 
relative mix of public information trading to private information trading will be in favor of the 
latter. The relative mix will become more favorable for public information trading as the 




  We modify Corvig and Ng’s (2004) model and apply it using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) technique. The model postulates that stock turnover is a function of 
information flow and can be represented by the function: 
 
Vt+1 = a + b*Vt + c*Vt*Ft 
 
Where Vt is detrended log Turnover and Ft measures information flow in time period t. 
Since firms typically have both institutional and private stockholders, we sort the firms in our 
sample into subgroups based on institutional ownership. We use five group (quintile) and ten 
group (decile) sorts and test the hypothesis whether private information is a stronger driver of 
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stock turnover in firms with low institutional ownership as compared to firms with high 
institutional ownership by using the two groups at each end i.e. the group with the highest (hi) 
and the group with the lowest (lo) institutional ownership. Our two core models for testing this 
hypothesis take the following form: 
 
Model 1:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t 
 
Model 2:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t 
 
Vhi(lo),t is detrended logTurnover in period t for the high (low) institutional ownership 
quintile/decile.  Turnover (daily) is calculated as shares traded on day t divided by outstanding 
shares on that day. Consistent with previous literature such as Campbell et al (1993) and Llorente 
et al. (2002), Turnover proxies for trading volume of individual stocks. LogTurnover(t) is 
computed as log[turnover(t) + 0.00000255]. A small constant is added to the turnover before 
taking the log to cater for situations where the trading volume on a particular day may be zero. 
The value of the constant is chosen to maximize the normality of the distribution of daily trading 
volume. Detrended V(t) = logTurnover(t) – (average of past 200 days’ logTurnover) 
The Turnover transformation we use is consistent with previous literature such as Lo and Wang 
(2001), Llorente et al (2002), and Corvig and Ng(2004). We use two measures of private 
information PI1 and PI2. PI1 is computed as log[(1 – r2 )/ r2 ] where r2 is obtained from the 
following regression: 
 
Rj = a + bRm + cRi + e 
 
where Rj, Rm and Ri are return on security j, market return, and security j’s industry return 
respectively. For each month, we regress each firm’s daily return on the market and 3-digit SIC 
value-weight industry returns. (1-r2) is a proxy for private information on the stock. This measure 
is used in Chen et al. (2007). We use the log transformation of this measure because in some 
years, 1-r2 is leptokurtic and negatively skewed. This transformation is used in Durnev, Morck, 
and Yeung (2004). 
We test whether the coefficient chi is less than the coefficient clo in our models. A 
significant difference validates hypothesis 1. 
The two core models for testing hypothesis 2 are models 3 and 4 below: 
 
Model 3:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
Model 4:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
             :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +  e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
 
MV(t) is detrended logTurnover of the Market in period t and is transformed in the same way as 
Vt. 
|RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market and the 
risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| proxies for publicly available market information and the 
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coefficient e on the cross product term measures the effect of market information. We follow 
here Corvig and Ng (2007), Llorente et al. (2002) and Durnev and Nain (2007). 
We test whether the coefficient ehi is more than the coefficient elo in our models. A 
significant difference validates hypothesis 2. 
It is necessary to examine whether our findings are driven by missing variables. For this 
purpose, we develop eight additional models to perform robustness tests. These models 
progressively add control variables to our core models – variables that extant literature has 
shown to significantly influence stock trading volume. 
Several researchers have documented the relationship between stock return volatility and 
trading volume, for example Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) and Lee and Rui (2002). These 
studies provide convincing evidence of a contemporaneous as well as dynamic relationship 
between return volatility and trading volume. Accordingly, we sequentially introduce stock and 
market volatility into Models 3 and 4. 
 
Model 5:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
Model 6:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
Model 7:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
Model 8:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
 
Stock volatility (stk_Volat) is computed as the volatility of the daily stock return over the 
past thirty days. Similarly market volatility (M_Volat) is computed as the volatility of the market 
return over the past thirty days. 
 Researchers such as Gallant et al (1992) find that large price movements are followed by high 
volume. Accordingly, we introduce stock price run up as a control variable in Models 9 and 10. 
 
Model 9:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
Model 10:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) +e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
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Stock price run up (stk_runnup) is measured as the thirty day run up in stock price. 
There is conflicting evidence on the relationship between momentum and volume. Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) show a relationship between turnover and momentum profits. Connolly 
and Stivers (2003) also evidence such a relationship but Scott et al. (2003) attribute this observed 
relationship to underreaction to earnings news. They find that the interaction between 
momentum and volume disappears when a stock’s growth rate and earnings-related news are 
controlled for. It is necessary, therefore, to add momentum as a control variable regardless of 
whether there is a direct relationship or whether this observed relationship is a proxy for growth 
rate and the underreaction to earnings news. The addition of momentum generates Models 11 
and 12.  
 
Model 11:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
+fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt    
 
:  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
Model 12:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt 
    
:  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
Market momentum (M_momentum) is measured as the raw returns of the market in the past two 
months. 
The above SUR regression models require the formation of high and low institutional 
ownership portfolios and use portfolio returns in the regressions. In order to test the robustness of 
our results using individual stock returns , we perform cross-sectional regressions using the first-
order autoregressive model of Corvig and Ng (2004) to study the differential impact of private 
and public information on trading volume. 
The basic model takes the following form: 
Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + εi,t+1   
Where: 
Vi, is detrended log turnover, and Dk,t+1  are the day-of-week dummy variables. 
The model is then augmented by adding private information flow. With the two measures of 
private information we use in this paper, we get the following two versions: 
  Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI1i,t + εi,t+1 
And 
Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI2i,t + εi,t+1 
The coefficient a1,I for  Vi,t  represents the constant component of volume autocorrelation 
whereas the coefficient a2,iVfor Vi,tPI represents the effect on volume autocorrelation that varies 
with the flow of information. 
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DATA 
 
We start with all the NYSE firms in the CRSP database during the period 1990-2007. We 
delete financials (6000-6999) and utilities (4000-4949). We also exclude ADRs and REITs, and 
firms with firm-year observations with less than 30 days of trading. Finally we delete from our 
sample firms that do not have common shares traded as indicated by CRSP share codes 10 or 11. 
We conduct two parallel set of tests; in one, we dice the sample into ten groups (deciles) in 
descending order of institutional ownership and in the other we dice the full sample into five 
groups (quintiles) based on the same criterion. Stocks in each group constitute an equal weighted 
portfolio. The portfolios are rebalanced each year. The model inputs come from the top and 
bottom decile (quintile) portfolios – the two being representative of high and low institutional 
ownership. We also divide the full sample period into two sub periods 1990-97 and 1998-2007 to 
test for the stability of the results. 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the high (top decile) and low (bottom decile) 
institutional ownership portfolios in our sample. In all of the attributes listed in the table, there is 
a statistically significant difference in the mean and median of the high and low institutional 
ownership portfolios. It is self-evident from the table that the high institutional ownership 
portfolio is comprised of firms with larger size, higher stock price (PRC), greater stock turnover, 
and a larger holding period profit (Hpret). Consistent with the hypotheses we are investigating, 
both the measures of private information, PI1 and PI2, are larger in low-institutional ownership 
firms as compared to the high-institutional ownership firms. 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
Core model augmented with standard control variables 
 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating models 1 to 12 with a ten group sort of the data 
based on decreasing institutional ownership. Table 3 reports the result of a similar sort but into 
five groups. Hereafter, we refer to the two variables V*PI1 and V*PI2 jointly as Vt.Inf. We 
focus on the coefficients of Vt.Inf for hypothesis 1, and the coefficient of Mkt.Inf for hypothesis 
2. A negative coefficient on Vt.Inf indicates that private information and turnover are negatively 
related. If the Vt.Inf coefficient is negative for both the high and low institutional 
deciles/quintiles, then a larger negative coefficient for the high institutional group supports 
hypothesis 1. If the coefficients are positive for both the high and low institutional groups then a 
smaller positive for the high institutional group backed by a significant F-value for the model 
would also support hypothesis 1. 
The coefficient for Mkt.Info provides evidence for the veracity of hypothesis 2. A more 
positive coefficient for the high institutional ownership decile/quintile or a less negative one 
compared to the low institutional ownership group implies that the less overconfident investors 
i.e. the high institutional group relies more on public information (Mkt.Info) as compared to the 
more overconfident investors i.e. the less institutional group. This is supportive of hypothesis 2. 
Models 1 and 2 for both the decile and quintile sort validate hypothesis 1. The coefficients for 
Vt.Inf with PI1 are -0.0483 and -0.0193 for the high and low institutional ownership in Model 1 
of Table 2, and the F-value is 2.98 which is significant at the 10% level. When PI2 is used as the 
measure of private information in Model 2, the coefficients for Vt.Inf are -0.0271 and 0.0075 for 
the high and low specifications with an F-value of 3.94 which is significant at the 5% level. The 
Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business  
Trading volume, page 10 
results in Table 3 with the quintile sort are even more significant. The coefficients for Vt.Inf 
(PI1) are -0.0766 and 0.0015 for the high and low specifications respectively with an F-value of 
23.75 which is significant at the 1% level. With PI2, the results are similar. The coefficients for 
Vt.Inf with PI2 are -0.4425 and 0.0136 for the high and low regressions respectively and the F-
value of 20.31 is significant at the 1% level.  
Then we introduce detrended market turnover (MVt) and market information (M.Info) 
into the models, the latter as a proxy for public information, and test hypotheses 1 and 2 together 
in Models 3 and 4. In the decile sort, the Vt.Info coefficients for both Models 3 and 4 support 
hypothesis 1; the high coefficient for Vt.Info (PI1) (-0.0286) is more negative than the low 
coefficient (-0.0256) in Model 3 and similarly the high coefficient of Vt.Info (PI2) (-0.0219) is 
smaller than the low coefficient (0.0068) in Model 4, but the F-values for hypotheses 1 is 
significant only in Model 4. For the public information proxy, the coefficients for M.Info in 
Models 3 and 4 are supportive of hypothesis 2 i.e. the positive coefficients of  the high equations 
(8.5719 and 9.0401) are greater than the positive coefficients of the low equations (5.3324 and 
6.1926) in Models 3 and 4. However the F-values for hypothesis 2 in both models are not 
significant. With the quintile sort, both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are validated. The signs and sizes of 
the coefficients for Vt.Info and M.Info are as predicted by hypotheses 1 and 2, and the F-values 
for the hypotheses are significant. 
Next we start introducing the control variables. The first control variable introduced is 
stock volatility. The estimation results after the introduction of this variable are provided in 
Models 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3. In the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of Vt.Info 
(PI2) coefficients in the high and low equations of Model 6 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (-
0.0199<.0038) and the F-value for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the 
high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have the expected signs and sizes in Model 5, 
and neither is the F-value significant for hypothesis 1. For the public information proxy, MInfo, 
the sign-size combinations in both Models 5 and 6 are supportive of hypothesis 2 but the F-
values of both models are not significant. The t-statistics of the control variable stock volatility 
are significant for the high equations of Model 5 and 6, but not so for the low equations of the 
SUR model. Thus stock volatility appears to be significant only for portfolios with high 
institutional ownership. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size combinations for the 
coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public information proxy MVt are supportive of 
hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 5 and 6, but the F-values for both hypotheses in both the 
models are not significant. 
The next control variable introduced is market volatility (M. Volatility). The estimation 
results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 7 and 8 of Tables 2 and 3. In 
the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of the high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI2) 
are supportive of hypotheses 1 (-0.0198<.0077) in Model 8 and the F-value for the hypothesis is 
significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have 
the expected signs and sizes in Model 7, and neither is the F-value significant for hypothesis 1. 
For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size combinations in both Models 7 and 8 are 
supportive of hypothesis 2 but the F-values of both models are not significant. The t-statistics of 
the control variable market volatility are significant for the low equations of Model 7 and 8, but 
not so for the high equations. Thus while stock volatility appears to be significant only for 
portfolios with high institutional ownership, market volatility appears to be significant only for 
portfolios with low institutional ownership. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size 
combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public information proxy 
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M.Info for both Models 7 and 8 are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2, but the F-value for only 
hypothesis 2 of Model 7 is significant while the other F-values are not. 
Stock run up (Stk_Runup) is then introduced as a dependent variable. The estimation 
results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 9 and 10 of Tables 2 and 3.  
In the decile sort (Table 2), the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI2 in the 
high and low equations of Model 10 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (-0.0177<.0114) and the F-
value for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients 
of Vt.Info (PI1) do not have the expected signs and sizes in Model 9, and the F-value for  
hypothesis 1 is not significant. For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size 
combinations in both Models 9 and 10 are supportive of hypotheses 2 but the F-values of both 
models are not significant. The t-statistics of the control variable Stock run up are significant for 
the low equations of Model 9 and 10, but not so for the high equations. Interestingly, stock 
market volatility that was previously significant only for the high equations, now becomes 
significant for the low equations as well but with a negative sign. Thus stock market volatility 
positively impacts turnover of stocks with high institutional ownership, but it negatively impacts 
turnover of stocks with low market volatility. In the quintile sort (Table 3), the sign-size 
combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with both PI1 and PI2, and the public information 
proxy M.Info are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 9 and 10, and the F-values are 
significant for hypothesis 1 for Model 9 but not so for Model 10. However, the F-values for 
hypothesis 2 are significant in both Models 9 and 10. 
The last control variable introduced in the model is market momentum (M.Momentum). 
The estimation results after the introduction of this variable are provided in Models 11 and 12 of 
Tables 2 and 3. In the decile sort, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of Vt.Info (PI2) in 
the high and low equations of Model 12 are supportive of hypothesis 1 (-0.0176<0.0115) and the 
F-value for the hypothesis is significant albeit at the 10% level. But the high and low coefficients 
of Vt.Info (PI1) in Model 11 do not have the expected signs and sizes, and the F-value for 
hypothesis 1 is not significant. For the public information proxy, M.Info, the sign-size 
combinations in both Models 11 and 12 are supportive of hypotheses 2 but the F-values of both 
models are not significant. The t-statistics for the newly entered control variable, market 
momentum, are not significant in any equation of Models 11 and 12. In the quintile sort (Table 
3), the sign-size combinations for the coefficients of Vt.Info with PI1 and PI2, and the public 
information proxy M.Info are supportive of hypotheses 1 and 2 in both Models 11 and 12. The F-
values for hypotheses 1 and 2 are significant for Model 11, but not significant for Model 12. 
 
Estimation results with truncated data  
 
We further explore the validity of the hypotheses by constraining the data only to certain 
time periods and/or by excluding firms with certain characteristics from the data set. Thus we 
estimate the full model i.e. the core model with the control variables for the sub-periods 1990-
1997 and 1998-2006. We also study the effect of excluding firms from the data set based on 
share price, size and liquidity; in each case we drop ten percent of the firms having the lowest 
share price, size, and liquidity. The results are summarized in Table 4. The first column provides 
a description of the data set and sort, the second summarizes the result of estimating the model 
for the whole period 1990-2006. The third and fourth column summarizes the results of 
estimating the model for the sub-periods 1990-1997 and 1998-2006. The first two rows 
summarize the results of the full model estimated using a decile and a quintile sort respectively. 
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The sub-period results indicate that the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2 had greater validity in 
the first sub-period 1990-1997 as compared to the second sub-period 1998-2006 because the 
number of models in which the hypotheses were found significant decline perceptibly in the 
second sub period. 
Rows 3 and 4 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which 
ten percent of the firms with the lowest share prices for that year have been excluded. In the 
decile sort (Row 3), the results for hypothesis 1 for the whole period improve marginally over 
the full data set in that the hypothesis becomes significant in Model 3 in addition to the models in 
which it was previously significant. The results for hypothesis 2 do not change. The results for 
the sub-periods are illuminating. There is a dramatic increase in the significance of hypothesis 1 
from being significant only in Model 2 during the first period to being significant in all twelve 
models in the second period. There is an equally dramatic turnaround in hypothesis 2. In the first 
sub-period, hypothesis 2 was significant in all models but with the wrong sign, implying that the 
turnover of stocks with low institutional ownership was more related to public information as 
compared to stocks with high institutional ownership. However, this position reversed in the 
second sub-period so that hypothesis 2 registered significance in seven models with the right 
sign. As a result of this dramatic turnaround, not surprisingly, hypothesis 2 does not show 
significance for the whole period as the effects of the two sub-periods are opposite and cancel 
each other out. Overall the results show that the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly 
valid for the period 1998-2006 once the firms with low value shares are excluded. The final 
conclusions from the quintile sort (Row 4) are similar – the propositions of hypotheses 1 and 2 
are valid, more so for the second sub-period than the first.  
  Rows 5 and 6 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which 
ten percent of the firms with the lowest log size for that year have been excluded. In the decile 
sort (Row 5), the results are generally poorer than for the full data set - both in the whole period 
and in the sub-periods. The only exception is hypothesis 2 in the second sub-period which shows 
significance in Models 3 and 4 whereas it was insignificant in all models in the full data set. 
Similar to the observation made in data set that excluded firms on size, we find that there is a 
dramatic reversal in the significance of hypothesis 2 proposition from the first to the second sub-
period. In the first sub-period, hypothesis 2 was significant in all models but with the wrong sign. 
In the second sub-period, all the models had the correct sign and the hypothesis was significant 
in Models 3 and 4. In the quintile sort (Row 6), the results for the whole period and the second 
sub-period are not as good as for the full data set. However, the first sub-period is an exception. 
The results for this sub-period are better in the truncated data set particularly for hypothesis 2 
which is significant in all models. The results suggest that overconfident traders use more private 
information in small stocks and that is the reason why the significance of private information 
drops when small size stocks are excluded.  
  Rows 7 and 8 summarize the results of estimating the full model on a data set in which 
ten percent of the firms with the lowest liquidity for that year have been excluded. Liquidity is 
measured using the Amihud formula which defines liquidity as absolute return divided by dollar 
volume. In both the decile and quintile sort, deleting the bottom ten percent liquidity stocks 
significantly lowers the likelihood that hypothesis 1 is supported in the full period as well as the 
sub-periods. This implies that overconfident traders use more private information in low-
liquidity stocks. The results for hypothesis 2 are more mixed. As compared to the full data set, 
the results for the significance of hypothesis 2 are marginally better in terms of significance for 
the whole period, are the same for the first sub-period, and are considerably better for the second 
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sub-period in the decile sort (Row 7). In the quintile sort, the results for hypothesis 2 are better 
only for the second sub-period. 
In conclusion, sub-sample results suggest that overconfident traders use more private 
information in small and/or low-liquidity stocks. Deleting the bottom ten percent small stocks or 
the bottom ten percent liquidity stocks in each year significantly lowers the likelihood that 
hypothesis 1 is supported. This observation applies to both the quintile and decile classifications. 
Deleting the bottom ten percent of the low-price stocks causes no significant change in the 
results of hypothesis 1. This suggests that low share price does not encourage the use of private 
information among overconfident traders. 
 
Results of the first-order autoregressive model 
 
In the SUR models described above, the inputs used in the regression are the equal 
weighted portfolio averages. In the autoregressive model, the regressions are performed using 
time-series cross-sectional method that employs individual stock data. The results are presented 
in Table 5. Panel A presents the results of the base model in which the lagged detrended log of 
the turnover and the day of the week dummy variables are the only explanatory variables. The 
results show the presence of strong first-order autocorrelation in both the high and low 
institutional ownership firms. However, the low institutional ownership firms exhibit a higher 
serial correlation in their trading volume as compared to high institutional firms. 
The model in Panel A is then augmented by introducing Vt.Info (PI1) as the measure of private 
information. The estimation of the resultant model is presented in Panel B. The results show that 
stocks with lower institutional ownership have a higher serial correlation in trading volume and 
are more influenced by private information as measured by PI1.  
Panel C model is similar to the Panel B model except that the private information measure used 
is PI2. The results show that stocks with lower institutional ownership have a higher serial 
correlation in trading volume and the volume is unaffected by private information as measured 
by Vt.Info. 
Overall the results in Table 5 suggest that stocks with low-institutional ownership exhibit 
significantly higher serial correlation in trading volume. There is some evidence, as seen in Panel 
B, that the trading volume of stocks of lower-institutional ownership is affected by traders’ 




In this paper, we add to the overconfidence literature by accounting for the source of 
information and the type of investor. The literature suggests that overconfidence is a major 
determinant of stock trading volume. Trading is triggered by the arrival of new information 
which may be public or private. Overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their 
private information signals and trade more than is warranted by the incoming signal. We 
postulate that private investors are more prone to overconfidence bias as compared to 
institutional investors. This implies that turnover in firms with low institutional ownership will 
be driven more by private information (hypothesis 1) while turnover in firms with high 
institutional ownership will be driven more by public information (hypothesis 2). This is the 
essence of the two hypotheses we explore. We use two measures of private information, PI1 and 
PI2, and sort the firms on the basis of institutional ownership into groups. We use both a ten 
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group sort and a five group sort and employ SUR models to study the hypotheses by examining 
the differences between the group with the highest and lowest institutional ownership. We find 
strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 1. PI1 and PI2 are found to be significant both in the 
decile and quintile sort when either PI1 or PI2 is the only explanatory variable besides the lagged 
value of the independent variable, turnover. Even in the full models with all the control variables, 
PI2 is significant in the decile sort (Model 12) and PI1 in the quintile sort (Model 11). In 
particular, PI2 is significant in all six models of the decile sort that use PI2 as a measure of 
private information. Evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 is more mixed. MV(t)* |RmRf| proxies for 
publicly available market information. Without the addition of control variables, the proxy is 
significant in the decile sort when PI2 is used as a measure of private information (Model 4). In 
the quintile sort, the public information proxy is significant regardless of whether PI1 or PI2 is 
used as a measure of private information. In the full model with all the control variables, the 
public information proxy is significant only in the quintile sort with PI1 as a measure of private 
information (Model 11). However, the sub-period analysis with truncated data finds strong 
evidence in support of hypothesis 2 in the second sub-period 1998-2006 when ten percent of the 
stocks having the lowest liquidity or lowest price are deleted from the data. This implies that 
managers of high institutional ownership stocks in the most recent period do rely more on public 
information for their stocks but not so if the stocks have a low price or the firms have poor 
liquidity. Finally, the first order autoregressive model provides further support for hypothesis 1. 
The results show that turnover volume of stocks with lower institutional holdings is affected by 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of share price, daily volume, firm size, and private information 
measures 
 High-Institutional 








 Mean Median Std 
Dev. 







PRC 32.30 28.25 26.71 5.32 2.25 14.57 746.8 <0.0001 
Log(size) 20.71 20.75 1.31 17.49 17.16 1.90 1147.3 <0.0001 
Turnover 0.0068 0.0042 0.0112 0.0028 0.0007 0.0145 186.2 <0.0001 
Detrended 
Turnover 
0.091 0.075 1.089 -0.016 0.063 2.530 78.1 <0.0001 
Hpret 0.224 0.139 0.544 0.085 -0.087 1.23 88.5 <0.0001 
PI1 0.534 0.593 1.930 2.29 2.24 1.62 577.6 <0.0001 
PI2 0.576 0.626 0.296 0.80 0.89 0.25 493.1 <0.0001 
No. of 
observations 
734699 702120   
 
PRC is share price; Hpret is holding period return and PI1 and PI2 are measures of private 











































Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest~ portfolios sorted on the basis 
of institutional ownership 
Private information me.asure is Pll in odd numbered models and PI2 in even numbered models 
Mo,M 1 Morl,J ?. MonF.1, MonF.1 4 MonF.1 ~ MonF.1 6 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
intercept 0.0341 0.0146 0.0337 0.0158 0.0293 0.0243 0.0287 0.0234 0.0075 0.0261 0.0062 0.0218 
11.21 2.39 11.31 2.63 9.37 3.94 9.38 3.97 -0.95 1.96 -0.81 1.67 
Yt 0.6349 0.818 0.6071 0.7368 0. 7408 0.84 73 0.7279 0.7823 0.7279 0.8411 0.7763 0.7828 
31.52 40.38 36.91 56.07 24.41 41.22 26.73 57.58 23.79 41.31 26.64 57.59 
-
Vt.Info 0.0483 0.0193 0.0271 0.0075 0.0286 0.0256 0.0219 0.0068 0.0139 0.0274 0.0199 0.0038 
-j.31 -2.28 -2.28 0.66 -1.92 -2.03 -1.67 0.61 -0.93 -2.34 -1.52 0.52 
IvIV1 0.2674 0.3129 0.2615 0.0323 0.2667 -31.28 0.2611 0.2998 
-8.52 -8.34 -8.55 -8. 71 -8.61 -8.34 -8.59 -8.16 
M.I*- 8.5719 5.3324 9.0401 6.1926 7.1228 5.3509 7.3799 6.9011 
6.32 1.91 6.9:; 2.25 5.16 1.89 5.5 2.19 
~ Volatility 4.3081 0.1531 3.8377 0.2527 
5.81 -0.13 5.05 0.21 
lv!kts:Y.2!;i,ti!i!v 
Stk .. Runu.2 
M.1',igm.~!!!JJill 
F-value 
Hypothesis 1 2.98 3.94 0.03 2.80 0.60 2.67 
































Hypothesis 2 1.36 1.12 0.40 0.22 
(0.2428) (0 .2904) (0.5268) (0.638:;) 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest.~ portfolios sorted on the 
basis of institutional ownership 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
High Low High Low High LO\V High Lo,v High Lo,v High Low 
intercept 0.0107 0.0071 0.0094 0.0042 0.0186 0.0189 0.0151 0.0053 0.0168 0.0081 0.0145 0.0052 
-1.35 0.44 -1.22 0.27 -2.14 -0.64 -1.81 -0.33 -1.94 -0.49 -1.74 -0.33 
~ 0.6267 0.8465 0. 723 7 0.7811 0.6771 0.7943 0.6929 0. 7506 0.6749 0. 7827 0.6928 0. 7506 
23.6 40.94 26.56 57.42 21.14 36.04 24.91 53.35 21.09 35.37 24.9 53.53 
Vt.Infu 0.0135 0.0254 0.0198 0.0077 0.0041 0.0084 0.0177 0.0114 0.0047 0.0084 0.0176 0.0115 
-0.91 -1.98 -1.51 0.78 0.26 -0.96 -1.36 1.03 0.31 -0.96 -1.35 1.03 
-
MY! 0.2649 0.331 7 0.2594 0.2982 0.2451 0.2851 0.2361 0.2701 0.2438 0.2824 0.2374 0.2303 
-8.55 -8.31 -8.53 -8.51 -7.83 -1.53 -7.71 -7.33 -7.79 -7.49 -7.72 -7.33 
M.Infa 7.1241 5.9724 7.3422 4.7011 7.4963 3.9386 7.4432 4.6037 7.3458 4.191 7 7.2898 4.5595 
5.12 1.37 5.3-1 1.65 5.39 1.3·1 5.52 1.62 5.27 1.·15 5.0~ 1.06 
~olatility 6.3733 2.5446 5.8236 2.0748 7.3659 3.9763 6.6811 3.1629 7.3159 3.7403 6.5519 3.1688 
2.96 -1.6 2.75 -1.32 3.43 -2.5 3.15 -2.02 3.39 -2.36 3.09 -2.03 
~ latilitv 2.2394 5.3165 1.8063 5.507 4 2.7342 8.5666 2.4044 7.5618 2.7581 8.5534 2.2693 7.5754 
-1.01 2.27 -0.84 2.24 -1.22 3.54 -1.09 3.28 -1.23 3.85 -1.02 3.29 
Stk Runu2 0.1098 0.3814 0.1208 -3108 0.0144 0.3309 0.1153 0.3103 

































0.6422 0.2051 0.6429 0.1839 
-1.64 -0.25 -1.64 -0 .22 
t-value 
Hypothesis 1 0.47 2.67 0.52 2.90 0.56 2.8 , 
(0 .4934) (0.1000) (0.4495) (0.0887) (0.4565) (0.0902) 
Hypothesis 2 1.21 0.88 1.31 1.04 1.23 0.96 
(0 .2708) (0.3483) (0.2519) (0.3086) (0 .2674) (0.3269) 
0 
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The table shows SUR estimates of the models: 
Model 1:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t 
 
Model 2:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t 
 
Model 3:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
 
Model 4:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
 
Model 5:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
 
Model 6:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
 
Model 7:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
 
Model 8:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
 
Model 9:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
 
Model 10:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
 
Model 11:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +  
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
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 flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
Model 12:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +  
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
 flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
The subscripts hi and lo denote the portfolio with the highest and lowest institutional ownership 
respectively and t is a subscript that tracks the periods. V is detrended log turnover, PI1 and PI2 
are two measures of private information, V*PI1 (PI2) is V.Info; MV is detrended log turnover of 
the market, and |RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market 
and the risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| is M.Info and proxies for publicly available market 
information; Stk.Volatility is stock volatility and M_Volat is market volatility; stk_runnup is 

































































Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest quintile portfolios sorted on the 
basis of institutional ownership 
Private.information measure is PI 1 in odd numbere:1 models and PI2 in even numbere.d models 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Luvv 
intercept 0.02:;4 0.0077 0.0222 0.0087 0.0232 0.0183 0.0232 0.0183 0.0065 0.0283 0.0093 0.0298 
8.31 1.94 8.09 2.21 8.08 4.51 7.82 4.54 -0.95 3.46 -1.37 3.54 
Y1 0.6919 0.8206 0.9311 0.7899 0.7898 0.8585 0.94 79 0.8966 0.7562 0.8093 0.8534 0.9002 
35.lS 38.41 15.04 13.49 21.01 46.67 12.98 15.44 19.96 40.72 l 1.48 14.55 
-
VLlnfu 0.0766 0.0015 0.4425 0.0136 0.0533 0.0094 0.2929 0.0753 0.0396 0.001 7 0.1867 0.0834 
-5.31 0.18 -5.13 0.21 -3.56 -1.16 -3 .35 -1.44 -2.43 -1.45 -2.1 1 -1.29 
~ 0.2891 o.:;037 0.2799 0.2988 0.2696 0.3007 0.2669 0.2951 
-7.81 -12.12 -7.81 -12.14 -7.48 -12.09 -7.46 -12.01 
M.Info 8.4841 4.5111 8.2496 4.5272 7.2377 4.9213 7.0517 4.9956 
6.55 2.49 6.29 2.51 5.52 2.69 <" _,.:,:, 2.71 
Stk.Volatilitx 3.4546 1.0131 :;_6761 1.2792 
0.81 -1 .4 1 5.31 -1.49 



































Hypothesis 1 23.75 20.31 7.02 4.36 2.24 0.94 
(0 .0001) (.0001) (0.0)81) (0.0368) (0.1345) (0 .3314) 
Hypothesis 2 5.65 4.87 1.92 1.44 
(0 .0175) (0.0274) (0.1664) (0.2301) 
Table 3 (Continue.cl) 
Results of the SUR models when run for the full sample period on the highest and lowest quintile portfolios sorted on the 
basis of institutional ownership 
Model 7 Model 8 Model9 Mode! IO Model!! Model 12 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
int.er:ept 0.0108 0.0163 0.0107 0.0169 0.0191 0.0079 0.0214 0.0097 0.0185 0.0078 0.0209 0.0097 
-1.53 1.63 -1.94 1.63 -2.44 0.74 -2.77 0.93 -2.38 0.74 -0.271 0.92 
Yt 0.7473 0.8549 0.8449 0.9039 0. 7109 0.8029 0.7674 0.8353 0.8098 0.8031 0. 7661 0.8364 
19.59 40.72 11.34 15.56 18.34 35.72 10.14 14.02 l E.03 35.72 10.13 14.26 
- - -
Villfu 0.0362 0.0113 0.1848 0.0868 0.0235 0.0019 0.1084 0.0368 0.1)234 0.0018 0.1081 0.0368 
-2.38 -1.29 -2.07 -1.34 -1.65 0.22 -1.21 -0.57 -1.53 0.22 -1.21 -0.57 
MY$. 0.2622 0.3013 0.2602 0.2957 0.2476 0.2775 0.2459 0.2719 0.2496 0.2772 0.2552 0.2781 
-7.25 -12.12 -7.24 -12.03 -6.81 -11.08 -6.81 -10.99 6.79 -1 1.08 -0.79 -10.~8 
M.Info 7.1239 4.1145 6.8307 4.1355 7.4629 4.4165 7.2405 4.2867 7.3563 4.4277 7.1388 4.3206 
5.37 2.19 5.15 2.22 5.62 2.37 5.41 2.29 5.54 2.37 5.32 2.31 
Stk.Volatilit)'. 5.9721 3.9209 5.4626 3.2003 6.1708 3.6623 6.2633 3.7558 6.58 16 3.68 17 6.1031 3.7786 
'.l.)9 -l..Y/ 1..:;:; -l..6/ l..91 -i.04 Lli -i .l:l '.l.84 -i .9'.> '.l.66 -i .l ) 
lvlkt .Volatilit)'. 2 .1 777 3.4377 1.3525 3.5888 2.3055 4.8508 1.6375 4.2877 2.1905 4.8655 1.4741 4.7983 
-0.92 2.19 -0.57 2.28 -0.89 3.66 -0.69 3.03 -0.92 3.07 -0.62 3.04 
Stk _Runu,2 0.1494 0.2583 0.1371 0.2842 0.1443 0.2538 0.1316 0.2403 

































MMomentum 0.4094 0.0559 0.4181 0.1432 
-1.09 0.11 1.11 0.26 
F-value 
Hypothesis 1 2.19 0.85 2.69 0.45 2.74 0.45 
(0.1393) (0.3562) (0.0984) (0.5002) (0.0988) (0.5031) 
Hypothesis 2 3.07 2.47 3.20 2.96 2.96 2.66 
(0.0801) (0.1160) (0.0735) (0.0854) (0.0855) (0.l0i0) 
a 
Journal of Behavioral Studies in Business  
Trading volume, page 25 
 
 
The table shows SUR estimates of the models: 
Model 1:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI1hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI1lo,t 
 
Model 2:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + bhi*Vhi,t + chi*Vhi,t*PI2hi,t 
   :  Vlo,t+1 = alo + b(lo)*Vlo,t + clo*Vlo,t*PI2lo,t 
 
Model 3:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
 
Model 4:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| 
 
Model 5:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
 
Model 6:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t 
 
Model 7:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
 
Model 8:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt 
 
Model 9:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) +  e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
 
Model 10:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t 
   :  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t 
Model 11:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI1(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +  
    fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt 
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:  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI1(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
    flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
Model 12:  Vhi,t+1 = ahi + b(hi)*V(hi,t) + c(hi)*V(hi,t)*PI2(hi,t) + d(hi)*MV(t) + e(hi)*MV(t)* |RmRf| +  
    fhi*stk_Volathi,t + ghi*M_Volatt + hhi*stk_runnuphi,t + M_momentumt 
    
:  V(lo,t+1) = a(lo) + b(lo)*V(lo,t) + c(lo)*V(lo,t)*PI2(lo,t) + d(lo)*MV(t) + e(lo)*MV(t)* |RmRf| + 
    flo*stk_Volatlo,t + glo*M_Volatt + hloi*stk_runnuplo,t + M_momentumt 
 
The subscripts hi and lo denote the portfolio with the highest and lowest institutional ownership 
respectively and t is a subscript that tracks the periods. V is detrended log turnover, PI1 and PI2 
are two measures of private information, V*PI1 (PI2) is V.Info; MV is detrended log turnover of 
the market, and |RmRf| is the absolute value of the difference between the return on the market 
and the risk free rate. MV(t)* |RmRf| is M.Info and proxies for publicly available market 
information; Stk.Volatility is stock volatility and M_Volat is market volatility; stk_runnup is 
stock runup and M_momentum is market momentum. 
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Table 4 
Summary of sub-period and truncated data analysis 








H2: all insignificant 
 
 H1: significant in 
models 2,4,6,10,12  
 
H2: all insignificant 








H1: significant in 
models 1,2,3,4,9,11 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 3,4,7,9,10,11  
 
H1: significant in 
models 1,2 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models  
3,4,9,10,11,12 













H2: all insignificant 
 
H1: significant in 
model 2 
 
H2: wrong sign and 
significant in all 
models 
H1: significant in 
all models 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 
3,4,5,6,7,9,11 









H2: correct sign in 
all. All significant. 




H2: correct sign in 








H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
all models 




H1: significant in 
models 1,2,10,12 
 
H2: all insignificant 
H1: significant in 
models 2,11,12 
 
H2: wrong sign and 





H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 3,4  








H2: all insignificant 




H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
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H2: all insignificant 
except model 3 
 
H2: all insignificant 
insignificant 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
all models. 




H1: significant in 
models 1,3 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 3, 4 
 
H1: significant in 
models 1,3,5 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 10, 12 
H1: significant in 
model 1 
 
H2: correct sign in 
all. Significant in 
models 1,3, 7 
Table 4 (Continued): 
 
Significant means significant at the one, five or ten percent level. 
No PRC means 10% of the firms with the lowest share price have been deleted from the full data 
set. 
No Size means 10% of the firms with the smallest size have been deleted from the full data set. 
No Liq means 10% of the firms with the lowest liquidity have been deleted from the full data set. 
H1 is hypothesis 1 and H2 is hypothesis 2. 
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Table 5 
Serial correlation and the effect of information flow on stock trading of high versus low 
institutional ownership (t-values in brackets).   
Table 5 Panel A 
   Intercept      a1            Model Fitness 
 ___________________________________________________  
   High  0.0901   0.0099  F=192.79   
   (8.14)   (4.52)  (p<0.0001) 
 
  Low  -0.165   0.042  F=1127.5 
   (-2.39)   (6.48)  (p<0.0001) 
 ___________________________________________________ 
 High-Low    -0.032 
      (-4.63) 
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual 
stocks: 
  
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + εi,t+1 
V is detrended log(turnover) and D is day of the week dummy variable. 
 
Table 5 Panel B: 
   Intercept      a1                    a2  Model Fitness 
 _________________________________________________________________  
   High  0.0896   0.0097  0.0007  F=106.29   
   (7.30)   (6.01)  (0.90)  (p<0.0001) 
 
  Low  -0.1635  0.0364  0.0017  F =523.1 
   (-0.06)   (5.01)  (1.89)*** (p<0.0001) 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 High-Low    -0.032  -0.0010 
      (-3.29)) (-0.67) 
 
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual 
stocks: 
 
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI1i,t + εi,t+1  
 
V is detrended log(turnover), D is day of the week dummy variable and PI1 is a measure of 
private information. 
 
Table 5 Panel C: 
 
   Intercept      a1                    a2  Model Fitness 
 _________________________________________________________________  
   High  0.0901   0.0079  0.0011  F=98.90   
   (7.41)   (3.14)  (1.33)  (p<0.0001) 
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  Low  -0.1601  0.0420  0.0007  F =563.9 
   (-2.22)   (3.48)  (1.10)  (p<0.0001)
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 High-Low    -0.034  0.0004 
      (-2.17)) (0.14) 
The table shows estimates of the time-series cross-sectional regression on all the individual 
stocks: 
 
Model : Vi,t+1 = Σ a0,ik Dk,t+1 + a1,iVi,t + a2,iVi,tPI2i,t + εi,t+1  
 
V is detrended log(turnover), D is day of the week dummy variable and PI2 is a measure of 
private information. 
 
